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Judicial Candidate Speech After
Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White
Jan Witold Baran

he people want to elect judges. Notwithstanding a typical
Washington lawyer’s view of the judiciary enshrined in
Article III of the Constitution, the citizens of 39 states
insist that judges should be subject to electoral accountability
and not be given lifetime appointments by the government
elites. For that reason, 53% of state appellate judges must run
in contested elections for an initial term on the bench (out of
1,243 judges). Likewise, 66% of state trial court judges (8,489)
must first run in contested elections. Eight-seven percent of all
state appellate and trial judges face some type of election for
subsequent terms.1 This insistence on elections creates a tension that Professor Stephen Gillers calls the “on the one hand,
on the other hand” dilemma.2 On the one hand, we expect that
judges not make extrajudicial or prejudicial comments about
the law, particularly controversial legal principles, while on the
other hand voters want information in order to cast an informed
vote. Likewise, there is a constitutional dilemma. The due
process rights of litigants must be preserved, but the First
Amendment rights of candidates and their supporters must be
honored. The Supreme Court of the United States in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White,3 has weighed in in favor of First
Amendment rights. Candidates cannot be gagged by Canon 5.
The Minnesota case brought the dilemmas into focus, but not

T

in the best of circumstances. First, the version of Canon 5 used
by the Minnesota courts was the broadest and most unreasonable. Minnesota used the 1972 version of the model code,
which has long been abandoned by the ABA. The contested
clause prohibited any candidate for election to judicial office to
“announce his or her views on disputed legal or political
issues.” The clause can be read—and was read by the
Minnesota disciplinary committee—to prohibit virtually any
commentary about legal or political issues.4 This resulted in
what Professor Gillers described as the “rule of silence.” In
order to avoid any possible claim of a violation of Canon 5, a
candidate limited herself to discussing only safe topics such as
one’s credentials (she graduated from the state law school, law
review, Order of the Coif, but probably without mention of any
law review articles authored by the candidate), or innocuous
statements such as, “I promise to uphold the rule of law,”
although that statement can become controversial if stated in
the context of a discussion of a subject such as abortion.
We are familiar with the oft-repeated observations of Judge
Richard Posner in Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,5 in
which he noted that every issue is potentially subject to litigation that may come before an elected judge. Similarly, the “rule
of silence” was impractical because it gave voters no valuable
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was not broadly interpreted by the Minnesota disciplinary committee to prohibit commentary about legal or political issues. Roy
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REVIEW, Spring 2002, at 8 n.7. Schotland correctly quotes from
the majority opinion and Justice Stevens’s dissent regarding the
history of the board’s treatment of plaintiff Wersal and the lack of
sanctions for violations of the clause, respectively.
Schotland does not mention, however, that the Court also
made this statement: “There are, however, some limitations that
the Minnesota Supreme Court has placed upon the scope of the
announce clause that are not (to put it politely) immediately
apparent from the text.” 122 S. Ct. at 2532. Indeed, the Court concluded with respect to both the state court and lawyers board
actions that “these limitations upon the text of the announce
clause are not all that they appear to be.” Id. at 2533. The Court
noted that at oral argument Minnesota stated that it could sanction

a candidate for critical statements of past judicial decisions even if
Wersal was not so sanctioned. Id. The Court found: “In any
event, it is clear that the announce clause prohibits a judicial candidate from stating his views on any specific nonfanciful legal
question within the province of the court for which he is running,
except in the context of discussing past decisions—and in the latter context as well, if he expresses the view that he is not bound
by stare decisis.” Id. at 2534.
What the opinion “politely” did not elaborate is the practice of
Minnesota to speak out of both sides of its mouth. The lawyers
board may not have sanctioned Wersal for some statements but it
interpreted the announce clause broadly, not at all, or, as Schotland
notes from the Court’s opinion, “equivocally.” The effect is to
make the announce clause as broad as described by the Court.
Candidates, who are most likely to debate issues, are challengers
and practicing attorneys. The reason why there are so few enforcement cases under the announce clause is the in terrorem effect of
broad or ambiguous interpretations. Candidates, including
Wersal, succumb to the “rule of silence” rather than risk complaints and the resulting damage to their careers. It is precisely
this Dickensian type of gamesmanship by disciplinary committees
that may result in additional First Amendment court decisions
striking down “pledges and promises” provisions.
5. 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993).
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information and actually distorted the sources and flow of
information, not from the candidates and their campaigns, but
from others, so-called third-party independent speakers, or in
the modern vernacular of campaign finance reform, the “special
interests.” Perhaps the reason the issue of the “announce”
clause became so prominent—and perhaps even the reason the
Supreme Court took the Minnesota case—is that judicial elections have become more like all other elections. In more and
more states, the courts (especially supreme courts) have
become lightening rods for dissatisfied constituencies. As a
result of public policy issues being resolved in courts rather
than in legislatures, the bench is increasingly viewed as a political participant. One need not claim that any particular judicial
decision is wrong or not within the province of a court.
Assuming that the courts are performing their proper roles,
they nonetheless are making big policy decisions that are creating large numbers of dissatisfied citizens who are responding by
mobilizing in the elections. The consequences are many. First,
it means that judges, particularly statewide elected judges, must
raise more and more money. Second, in those states with partisan elections, the political parties see judicial elections as part
of an overall political agenda. This has made races for the
bench in some states merely a part of the overall partisan electoral warfare.
In addition, independent interest groups have waded into
the breach. Business organizations, trial lawyers, organized
labor, and others increasingly sponsor advertising in connection with judicial elections. In this escalating environment, the
question is, what can the candidates themselves say about their
own campaigns when more and more other voices are commenting on the race? Some have suggested that the rule of
silence could silence everyone.6 Yet the Minnesota case
answered an important question: If candidates cannot be
restricted in what they say based on due process concerns, then
similar due process concerns would not justify restrictions on
what third parties might say. The Court’s decision striking
down the announce clause certainly seems to bolster the view
that the speech of third parties cannot be restricted.
Now that Minnesota’s “rule of silence” has been struck
down, where can a line be drawn? What are the implications
for restricting candidate statements? What is the future of judicial campaigns?
First, perhaps a new approach to the announce clause is possible. Professor Gillers once proposed a revision to the Canon
5 announce clause. His proposed rule is as follows: “A candidate for judicial office may state his or her general views on
legal issues, but must make it clear that these views are tentative and subject to arguments of counsel and deliberation.” 7
The proposed Gillers rule has the advantage of permitting
candidates to speak, but also reinforces to the voters the fact
that judges must judge. They cannot prejudge. At the same
time the proposed revised rule does not silence candidates. It
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their prerogative to state their
Gillers rule has
views about legal issues, but
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from making “pledges or
promises.” The Minnesota
case did not challenge that clause and there is much sympathy
for the concept of banning promises. Nevertheless, the clause
presents problems of its own. First, there is the issue of vagueness. What constitutes a pledge or promise? In Texas, a judge
was issued a public warning because his campaign literature
stated: “I’m very tough on crimes where there are victims who
have been physically harmed . . . . I have no feelings for the
criminal.”8 The Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct considered these statements as a pledge “not to show leniency
toward violent criminals.”9 But is it a pledge? Was the judge
pledging or was he announcing his view on the legal issue of
whether there should be tough sentencing of violent criminals?
In New York, a civil court judge was censured for violating
the pledges or promises clause because his “campaign literature gave the unmistakable impression that he would favor
tenants over landlords in housing matters.”10 The candidate
(who won) created the “unmistakable impression” by pointing
out that he was a tenant while his opponent was a landlord,
and by using testimonials from tenants who complimented his
handling of cases as a housing judge. At what point did the
candidate step over the line? Was it when he accurately
described himself as a tenant and his opponent as a landlord,
when he stated that he was a housing judge, or when he introduced the testimonials? Will housing judges who rent apartments in New York not be allowed to share this information
with the public because it would create the “unmistakable
impression” that they are pro-tenant?
The vagueness of the “pledges and promises” clause could be
compounded by uneven or sweeping enforcement. If judicial
commissions apply the pledges and promises clause as broadly
as the Minnesota commission interpreted its announce clause,
it will suffer a similar constitutional fate. At oral argument in
Minnesota, Justice O’Connor cynically guessed that the
announce clause was being used to “maintain incumbent
judges.” In the short term, the state supreme courts will have
to grapple with defining the remainder of Canon 5 to give can-

6. See Deborah Goldberg & Mark Kozlowski, Constitutional Issues in
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(2002).
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9. Id.
10. NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, Oct. 17, 1997.
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didates sufficient clarity while acknowledging that candidates
have a constitutional right to discuss political and legal issues.
That will be a daunting task.
At the same time, candidates must grapple with their new
“freedom.” It is one thing to have freedom of speech. What to
say is something else. In an election campaign, a candidate will
be asked, “What is your position on X?” In the past the candidate could say, “I cannot comment on that topic because it is a
legal or political issue.” While a candidate no longer can point
to Canon 5 for justification, she can still make a similar
response. Judicial candidates can adopt the time-honored practice of other politicians by evading direct answers. Unlike most
other politicians, judicial candidates will have a good political
reason to evade answers. The public has different expectations
of judicial candidates. They want their judges to be fair, evenhanded, and unprejudiced. Judicial candidates should capitalize on that expectation whenever possible. Therefore, when
asked, “What is your position on X?,” a candidate, even after
Minnesota, should consider stating (even if she has already
opined in past opinions or articles), “I don’t think it is appropriate for a judge [or prospective judge] to make statements on
this issue. It may come before the court when I will hear and
consider all the arguments.” This type of response at times may
not be possible, or may require further explanation with some
“neutral” comment about “issue X.” However, free speech is
not compulsory speech and voters expect something from a
judge that is not expected of a governor or congressman—fewer
press releases and more decorum.
As for questions from or advertising “attacks” by third-party
organizations, the candidate will have to exercise even more
restraint. Experience suggests that candidates in such circumstances benefit from backlash and sympathy. Supporting

groups tend to respond to such advertising in defense of the
candidate. The American Bar Association, for example, is
encouraging the creation of civic groups for exactly such purposes.11
Finally, there is a clear solution to the dilemmas created by
judicial elections. Justice O’Connor devoted her concurring
opinion to the history of judicial elections. In adopting elections, she noted that “the State has voluntarily taken on the
risks to judicial bias.”12 Implicitly, she was suggesting that elections be replaced with judicial selections. In light of historical
public insistence on elections, merit selection is a difficult
proposition, but not one to abandon.
In sum, the Minnesota case creates the opportunity for more
debate. The quantity of additional debate will increasingly
depend on the candidates. The “rule of silence” has been struck
down, but there still may be occasions where silence will be
golden—and prudent politics.

11. Recommendation of the ABA Standing Committees on Judicial
Independence and Election Law, at http://www.abanet.org/

leadership/recommendations02/113.pdf (Aug. 2002).
12. 122 S. Ct. at 2544.
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